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RECENT CASES

adjoining property, the weight of reason would indicate the contrary
under facts similar to those of the instant case. Actually, there are
very few cases in the area of abstracting from which one could
draw for authority either way. Also, when one considers the purpose
of an abstract, the use the abstract will be put to, the dicta of the
North Dakota decision, the citation of a foreign jurisdiction's decision
with approval holding an abstracter to a duty of examination beyond
first glance, the duties of an agent toward his principal, and the
North Dakota Standards of Title, a sound argument is made for
holding an abstracter to a duty to examine records of adjoining
property in situations such as in the instant case.
DOUGLAS R. GRELL
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ABROGATION OF THE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE of the deceased father's estate brought an action for wrongful death,
and the mother for personal injuries, against the couple's unemancipated minor son for his negligence in driving the family automobile.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that immunity does
not exist where the parent and child relationship has been terminated
by death and personal liability suits by a parent against the child
are not so disruptive of family unity as to preclude their maintenance. Gaudreau v. Gaudreau,215 A.2d 695 (N.H. 1965).

AN

The instant case is an extension of an earlier 1965 New Hampshire case in which a widow recovered in an action brought individually and as next friend for her three minor children against
her deceased husband's estate.' Few jurisdictions have gone as
far as New Hampshire in abrogating the original parent-child tort
immunity doctrine, however, notably a similar result is found in
Wisconsin where recovery is allowed except where the negligent act
involves an exercise of parental authority over the child or an
2
exercise of ordinary parental discretion in providing necessities.
Also, in a 1932 Missouri decision, a mother was allowed recovery
in an action for personal injury against her unemancipated minor
child,3 but this case has since been overruled4 apparently leaving
Wisconsin and New Hampshire as the only jurisdictions which allow
an unemancipated minor to sue or be sued by his parents in a case
involving ordinary negligence when the tort feasor was not fatally

injured.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965).
Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo.Ct.App. 1932).
See Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953).
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The parent-child tort immunity doctrine was first embedded in
American jurisprudence in the landmark case of Hewellette
George,5 denying the maintenance of an action in the case of a
child's wrongful confinement to an insane asylum by her mother.
The original parent-child tort immunity doctrine precluded the maintenance of any personal injury actions between the parent and child
regardless of the state-of-mind of the tortfeasor or the severity of
the act.6 It has since been followed by an overwhelming majority
of jurisdictions for such various reasons as preservation of family
unity, 7 enforcement of filial discipline, 8 and consideration of public
policy.9
Although originally the doctrine appeared logically sound, the
doctrine of complete immunity has gradually been decimated by
exceptions through statute 0 and court decisions- until its application has now become sporadic and the tree of immunity has been
trimmed to a point of bare existence. Courts have refused to recognize the immunity doctrine where the tortious act was wanton or
willful since the action brought is the result and not the cause of
family discord.12 Exceptions to the immunity rule are also recognized where the child is emancipated, 13 where the parent and child
were respectively master and servant, "4 or where a principal and
agent relationship exists between the parent tortfeasor and a third
party.' 5 It has also been ignored when the parties are under a
family relationship other than parent-child.'0
With few exceptions, the prevalence of automobile liability insurance has not altered the doctrine. This point was advanced in
Fidelity Savings Bank v. Aulik,' 7 but rejected as a question of public
policy requiring legislative action for change. Others have held
that, although provisions in the policy itself may curb the possibility
of fraud and collusion, liability cannot be imposed due to the immunity doctrine.' 8 It has been stated, however, that when automobile liability insurance is compulsory, and the legislative enactment provides that recovery can be had directly from an insurer
by the one injured, a child may recover from the insurer for the
negligent injury inflicted by his parent, thereby contravening the
doctrine. 9
5.
6.

Rewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
E.g., Hewellette v. George, supra note 5; McKelvey v.

McKelvey, 111 Tenn.

77 S.W. 664 (1903) ; Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
7. E.g., Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
8. E.g., Silverstein v. Kastner, 342 Pa. 207, 20 A.2d 205 (1941).
9. E.g., Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954).
10.
11.
12.
Boock,

13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.

19.

388,

E.g. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 331.031 (Supp. 1966).
Su ra notes 1 and 2.
E.g., Teramano v. Teramano, 1 Ohio App.2d 504, 205 N.E.2d 586 (1965) ; Cowglll v.
189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).

E.g., Groh v. W. 0. Krahn, Inc., 223 Wis. 662, 271 N.W. 374 (1937).
E.g., Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930).
E.g., Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
Spaulding v. Mineah, 264 N.Y.

589

191 NE

578 (Ct.App.

1934).

Fidelity Savings Bank v Aulik, 252 Wis. 602, 32 N.W.2d 613 (1948).
Rambo v. Ranbo, 195 Ark

832

114 S.W.2d 468

(1938).

E.g., Mesite v. Kirchstein, i09 donn. 77, 145 All. 753 (1929).
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The abrogation of the original doctrine by the New Hampshire
and Wisconsin courts, and an indication by others that a change
by legislation would be desirable, 20 indicate that there is a definite
need for a re-evaluation of the doctrine to determine its feasibility
in this age of increased automobile use and common coverage by
liability insurance. In making this evaluation, family unity and
other policy considerations which dictate the desirability of the doctrine must be evaluated in the context of its present existence, for,
although the need has not diminished, this modern era has created
a situation in which the right to maintain a personal injury action
between parent and child should not be precluded solely on the
basis of the relationship of the parties. It is an anomalous system
indeed, that permits actions involving property rights 21 and the
contesting of wills,22 where a parent-child relation exists, and then
permits the exercise of a lesser degree of care with respect to the
personal welfare of one in the parent-child relationship than that
23
owed to a stranger.
The New Hampshire court has taken a liberal approach by
holding that family unity will not be so substantially disrupted by a
personal injury action between the parent and child as to preclude
its maintenance. This decision marks a complete abrogation of the
original immunity doctrine in New Hampshire. Wisconsin appears
to adopt a more realistic approach to the problem by denying immunity except where the negligent act involves an exercise of
parental authority over the child or an exercise of ordinary parental
discretion in providing necessities.
North Dakota, having no statutory or case law on this subject,
apparently still adheres to the doctrine as originally established, a
position demonstrated to be antiquated by the frequency and prevalence of exceptions made in other jurisdictions. Consequently, North
Dakota's legislature is in the unique position of being able to peruse
the cases and statutes and assess the immunity doctrine as it exists
in other jurisdictions untrammeled by judicial precedent of its own
courts and thereby formulate a legislative policy which would best
protect the rights of the family and still preserve the immunity in
a manner which would reflect the present status of the family
relationship.
RUSSELL D. MARING

20.
21.
22.
23.

Duffv v. Duffy. 117 Pa.Super, 500, 178 Atl. 165 (1935).
Caudill v. Caudill. 39 N.M. 248, 44 P.2d 724 (1985).
Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo.Ct.App. 1932).
E.g., Silverstein v. Kastner, 342 Pa. 207, 20 A.2d 205 (1941).

